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THE MISSION OF JAPAN AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

BY

Kota Hoshino



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
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

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THE

MISSION OF JAPAN

AND THE

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

BY

REV. KOTA HOSHINO.

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PREFACE.

The Rev. Kōta Hoshino, the author of this ittle book, was baptized when but a boy thirty years ago, and ten years later ordained to the Christian ministry in connection with the church now known as the Church of Christ in Japan, which is the result of the union of the Presbyterian and Reformed Churches. In addition to the work of the pastorate, he was for about ten years professor in the Ferris Girls' Seminary, and also in the Baptist Theological Seminary, Yokohama, and in 1902 was honored by his brethren in being chosen Moderator of the Synod. He is at present pastor of the Ryogoku Church in Tokyo, and while widely and favorably known as a successful minister of the Gospel in his own denomination, he has taken an active part in inter-denominational effort, notably in connection with the Japan Evangelical Alliance, the most representative Christian organization in Japan, being at present Vice-President of the Alliance. In connection with the movement they are now

carrying on for the benefit of the soldiers who are waiting to be sent to the War, as also the sick and wounded in hospital, he has but recently, at the request of the Central Committee, visited the important military stations at Hiroshima, Kure. Saseho, Kokura and Matsuyama, administering comfort to the men, directing the Christian work among them, and in a variety of ways sustaining the dignity of the Christian cause among a class of men usually little inclined to trouble themselves much about Christianity—not excluding the Russian captives now so generously treated by the Japanese Government.

Believing that at the close of the war with Russia, new opportunities and responsibilities will fall to the lot of the Christian Church in Japan, he is visiting America and Europe with a view to making careful observations into the educational and religious conditions, and bringing back to Japan something that will contribute towards the solution of these great problems in his own country. He deserves a cordial reception wherever he goes.

The purpose and scope of this little book are clearly set forth in the title, and the theme may rightly claim the careful thought of the English-

speaking peoples. The author believes that the present struggle with Russia will have far-reaching consequences for the whole world, and that great benefit will accrue even to Russia in her defeat; and he desires only that the facts be known, especially by Japan's American and English friends. The translator greatly regrets that he has so imperfectly succeeded in bringing out the strength and beauty of the language in the original manuscript, and can only plead as excuse the many distractions of a busy life.

The Translator.

Tokyo, Japan, July, 1904.

INTRODUCTION.

Japan has been called the England of the East, and in many respects the two countries are much alike. Besides the fact that each lies close to the main land of a continent, they are both about the same size, both have a very irregular coast-line, with many bays and harbors, and about the same population.

If we look into their history, other resemblances may be seen, but leaving out of account the past and looking only at the present, although Japan's constitutional system is said to have been based on that of Germany, it is in fact generally regarded by the Japanese themselves that it is more correct to call it English. And if we speak of national responsibilities, instead of saying they are alike, we may rather say that they are identical, viz—that as England's mission in the past and

present is the extension of civilization and commerce throughout the world, so that of Japan is their extension at least throughout the Orient. Situated as they are in the extreme East and West, their alliance in 1902 for the promotion of their mutual interests and the peace of the Far East was no doubt in a sense the work of man, but it certainly was also providential. Not doubting that my readers will feel a deep interest in the subject treated, I venture to lay this little book before them for their perusal. After calling attention to the physical characteristics of Japan, some lessons will be drawn from her history, showing that if the nations of the West have a mission to the world, she has also—and to fulfil it, she must fight Russia;—but to its complete fulfilment what further does she need? An answer to this question will be attempted.

FIRST CHAPTER.

CHAPTER I.

Peculiar Physical Structure and Conditions in Japan.

The sovereignty of Japan extends from the Arai Island in the Kurile group on the north to Formosa on the South, between N. Lat. 21° 48′ and 50° 56′ and E. long. 190° 19′ 20″ and 156° 32,′ stretching over a distance of about 2,000 miles, with a width varying from 70 to 250 miles. Let us then look at the physical structure of this peculiarly-shaped Empire.

1.—Its Numerous Islands.

If we counted all, there would be several thousand islands, but considering only those with a circumference of 1 *ri* (about 2½ English miles) there are about 600. In proportion to the length and breadth of this island-Empire, the area is comparatively small, amounting to

163,000 square miles, or about twenty per cent larger than Great Britain and Ireland, about twenty per cent smaller than France, or about the same as the state of California, U. S. Taking the larger islands in the order of their size they are as follows:—

Hondo (Main Island).
Hokkaido (North).
Kyūshū (South).
Formosa (new possession in South).
Shikoku (South west).
Kurile Group (North).
Loocho „ (South).

&c., &c.

2.—Its Numerous Harbors and Extensive Coast-Line.

That this peculiarity has had a marked influence on the progress of civilization is commonly admitted, in the case of ancient Greece and of modern Britain. It is true that the modern railroad bringing all parts of a great country close together is a peculiarity of twentieth century

civilization; and yet this does not detract from the advantage accruing from the possession of an extensive coast-line indented with numerous bays and harbors. Japan has many good harbors. Though not more than ten are suitable for great international ports, yet there are several hundreds that amply supply local requirements.

As to coast-line Japan is without a parallel. According to the Government Report for 1903 Japan has a coast-line of 18141 miles, which lacks only a few thousands of the total circumference of the globe.

3.—Climate, Flora and Fauna.

The climate of Japan is very varied. Formosa on the South is not far from the torrid Zone and so is always hot; while the Kurile Islands in the North being near to the frigid zone, are always cold. Though we should expect the climate of the main island to be much the same as the mainland of the Asiatic continent, it in fact is much modified by the Black current which flows from the Philippine Islands along both the Eastern and Western coasts. This

being the case, people from hot countries like Africa or India, while able to enjoy in Japan a climate like their own, can also breathe cooler air than they have known, and on the other hand those from cold countries like Norway and Russia can find enough cold to suit them, and at the same time a delightfully mild climate too. It was not empty flattery when Madame Rosen, the wife of the Russian Minister till recently in Tokyo, said to a friend on her departure from Japan, that the leaving of a country like this, so beautiful for scenery and delightful for climate, was indeed hard to bear.

It is the general rule for the flora and fauna of islands to be less than those of continental countries, but Japan is an exception to this rule. as the Japanese islands do along the coast of Lying Asia, tropical plants and animals seem to be natural to the South, while in the North those natural to the frigid zone are found, and in the central portion those belonging to the temperate zone seem to find their way across from China and Corea.

Visitors to a Japanese museum will be surprised as they find there specimens from torrid,

temperate and frigid zones all gathered from such a small country as Japan.

4.—Mountains and Earthquakes.

While in addition to the physical features above mentioned, we may safely say that Japan is unique for picturesque scenery, and may even be called the Garden of the World, there is one feature which is far from being attractive. She certainly is a very mountainous country and well provided with earthquakes. The proportion of mountain and plain is about eight to one—with a very large number of volcanoes. This latter fact accounts for the frequent earthquakes. A foreigner who comes to reside in Japan, for the first two or three years may feel as if he were living in a big ship tossed by the waves. Yet during the 2500 years of Japan's history except for over-population, the Japanese have never felt the necessity of emigrating to other countries. There are indeed some parts of Japan where they know nothing of earthquakes. They chiefly occur in the central part of the main island. According to recent calculations, there are 480

earthquakes in a year,—thus averaging 13/10 daily; but of course the proportion of these actually felt is small, most of them being known only by the effect produced on the seismometers. The earthquakes are moreover almost wholly local and hardly ever general. Great earthquakes resulting in serious damage to life and property, according to some authorities, come once in six years, to others, in ten years, while others say only once in twenty years. On this point positive information is still lacking. There are more earthquakes in winter than in any other season, and at night more than in the daytime.

SECOND CHAPTER.

CHAPTER II.

Historical Characteristics.

1.—Japan's Absolute Independence from Time Immemorial.

Of course when compared with the history of Europe and America, there may be nothing special to note, but when compared with that of the Oriental nations, this is an exceptional phenomenon. In this one, Japan might more properly be classed with the Occidental than with the Oriental nations.

During her long history she invaded and subdued Corea, and several times made war with China, but in every case she fought on the offensive. There was indeed one instance in which she stood in a place of great jeopardy, when her independence was threatened to be blown out as a torch by the tempest. Every student of history is familiar with the story of

Genghis Khan the great leader of the Mongolian hordes that devastated China, Central Asia, India, Persia, Syria, Hungary, Poland and Russia, subduing them, and founding a great Mongolian Empire. The last victim to this terrible pestilence was to have been Japan. Having taken China and Corea, he could not bear to pass by beautiful Japan, and finally his grandson Kublai Khan sent an envoy to Japan demanding her surrender. This being refused he decided upon a great expedition to subdue her. Two expeditions were sent. The first time (1274 A.D.) 900 ships with 33,000 men embarked for Japan, but before reaching her coast all were destroyed by a great storm at sea. Seven years later (1281 A.D.) another was sent with 3500 ships and 130,000 men. On Japan's part there was the most resolute purpose and the most complete military preparedness to fight to the bitter end. But what was this in the face of a terrible foe that had subdued all Asia? If they had ever landed on Japanese soil her fate no doubt would have been sealed. But before war had begun at all, a terrible storm wrecked the great bulk of the enemy's ships, and again they were destroyed.

Very similar indeed was this to the destruction of the Spanish Armada that threatened Great Britain. In this way without striking a blow the invading army was repulsed; so no matter how much Japan may boast of her military prowess she well knows that this was not a victory she won for herself, but that it was due to the mighty work of an overruling Providence.

2.—Unique Relation between Ruler and Ruled.

From the beginning of Japan's history until now there has been but one dynasty and one people. From the first Emperor Jimmu Tennō to the present Mikado there has been an uninterrupted succession of rulers, all belonging to the same Imperial line. It must at least be admitted that this is a unique feature in universal history. Of course from time to time powerful warriors and statesmen have arisen who for some decades or even centuries held the reins of power, and the authority of the Emperor at such times was but nominal. If we count back three hundred years from the date of the present Emperor's

ascension to the throne—viz from 1867—we find the longest period in Japanese history in which the authority of the Emperor was in the hands of another, viz: the Tokugawa Shogunate, and the Emperor himself during that time was entirely removed from the arena of politics and was regarded as a god. But nevertheless that the Emperor was the true sovereign even during these times, was deeply imprinted upon the consciousness of the Imperial House itself and upon the conscience of the people. This idea wielded a tremendous political influence, and no matter how powerful the warrior or statesman, he was powerless to carry out any political designs without appealing to this recognized principle that the rightful sovereignty was with the Imperial Family. The clans which held power the longest were the Fujiwara, Hojo, Ashikaga, and Tokugawa, but only as the representatives of the Emperors. The fact is that the Japanese believe themselves to be decended from one family. The landing of the ancestor of the present Emperor, accompanied by his family and retainers, on the south-west shores of Japan is regarded as the beginning of

Japan's history. The idea therefore that the Emperor was both father and lord, and that the people were both children and subjects was the foundation of all political life. Here therefore is a striking contrast to the conditions in those countries where the people obeyed their ruler simply because conquered by him, as for example in the case of China. The reverence of the people for their sovereign and his love for his people are peculiarities which have excited the wonder of other nations; and no other intelligible explanation can be found for the establishment of constitutional government in 1890 without the shedding of a drop of blood. Just as parents delight in granting self-government to their children when they come of age, so was His Majesty graciously pleased to grant self-government to his people, viz—a reasonable measure of freedom and authority in matters political, intellectual and religious.

3.—Progressive Spirit.

The third historical characteristic to be noted is the uninterrupted progress of the past fifty

years. Up to that time for three hundred years the nation lived like a hermit in the mountains, cut off from the rest of the world, and wished to remain undisturbed. But through the kind insistence of America she was called forth from her isolation to mingle with the outside world, much as a child that shrinks from study is forced by its parents to go to school. From such a pupil we could hardly expect very much in the great school of civilization, but to every one's astonishment she has advanced far beyond all her other oriental school-mates, like China for example, who had entered the school much earlier than she. She has renewed her youth by assimilating the elements of occidental civilization, adopting a constitutional form of government, popular education, world-wide commerce, religious freedom and modern military methods. She has come to be recognized by the great nations as not unworthy of a place side by side with them on the great stage of cosmopolitan progress. The extent and rapidity of her progress may be gathered from the following statistics for the decade ending December 31st, 1903 —

	(1903).	(1893).
1.—Population	46,880,030	41,089,000
2.—Revenue	146,995,500	44,521,000
3.—Current Money (*tsuka*)	165,576,000	119,229 000
4.—Capital of Business firms ...	600,540,000	151,147,000
5.— „ „ Banks	263 483,500	55,817,000
6.—Exports.....	199,751,000	45,074 500
7.—Imports.....	158,067,500	44,677,500
8.—Import Taxes	8,035,500	2,562 500
9.—National Debt	280,582,000	141 759 500
10.—Tonnage of Steamships ...	610,000	110,000
11.— „ „ Sailing ships ...	334,000	45,000
12.— „ „ Fleet	257,000	61,000

If in connection with the foregoing historical characteristics, her independence, the unique family relation subsisting between ruler and ruled, and her marvellous progress, we also consider her geographical position and physical characteristics, the question—"What must be her mission to the world?" is one which should interest any thoughtful student of human progress, and especially those nations which have shown particular friendliness and sympathy towards her in her national ambitions.

THIRD CHAPTER.

CHAPTER III.

The Mission of the Japanese Nation.

Just as the individual life is ennobled by the consciousness of having a Heaven-appointed mission, so must it be with the life, progress and activity of the nation.

The ancient Greeks, Romans and Hebrews each believed they had a Divine call to make their own contribution to the world's progress, and so do the modern nations—England, the United States, Germany, France and Italy and others—and with this conviction they each are striving to work out their destiny.

In like manner Japan must also be providentially intended to work out a peculiar destiny.—*What then is her mission?* I wish to point out a few of the convictions which are at present shaping themselves in the consciousness of the Japanese nation as to their world-wide mission.

I.—To prove to the world that modern civilization is not local but universal.

A mistaken notion that very commonly prevails is that modern or Christian civilization is not intended to be general but limited to Europe and America, and that the so-called inferior races are incapable of it, except as subjugated by them. It seems to be thought by many that modern civilization may indeed be put on like a garment by such inferior peoples, but that it cannot be digested, assimilated and made part of their very life. Unfortunately this is a conclusion which seems to be warranted by the facts; such for example as that Africa and the Oriental nations generally have failed to lay hold of the benefits of civilization until brought under the sway of Western powers.

But this is a view which does not give expression to the real value of civllization, and is very much like that entertained by the ancient Jews that they were the divinely chosen people, and that no others could become such except by circumcision. But the early Gentile Christian church under the guidance of the Divine Spirit was taught that they could indeed become the Lord's chosen people even though they did not

become Jews, and thus they showed the essential nature of the Kingdom of God. Who, then, shall tell us the true value of modern civilization, if it be not this nation that has never known the loss of its independence, and that is blessed with that peculiar assimilative power and spirit of progress which have marked her modern history? Japan has not put on civilization as a garment, but has taken it into her very life and grown strong thereby. The reason for Japan's progress in politics, education, commerce, industry, manufactures, and navigation is not that she has become a dependency of Great Britain or come under the protectorate of America, but being herself the child of Civilization, she is glad to acknowledge her indebtedness to her elder brothers. Ten years ago China labored under the delusion that Japan was merely aping civilization, and suffered an ignominious defeat at her hands in consequence; and it looks as if a similar revelation and fate were now awaiting Russia. I do not say these things merely out of national pride but because I rejoice in emphasizing the cosmopolitan character of that civilization which has done so much for my country. It surely is her destiny

to continue to advance and show what a great thing civilized progress is, just as the early church, baptized with the Divine Spirit, exhibited the greatness of the Kingdom of God.

2.—To harmonize Eastern and Western thought.

No one questions that Western philosophical and religious thought is far in advance of Eastern, and yet no one claims that it is yet perfect. If eastern thought has any contribution to make to Western thought, the latter will doubtless gladly welcome it. In cases where western and eastern thought seem to be in conflict, by the very process of bringing them into contact with each other new truth will surely be discovered. Is Japan equal to this great task of harmonization? On the one hand we must consider the extent to which she has appropriated Western civilization during the past fifty years, and on the other hand how far she has digested oriental civilization. The former question has already been dealt with in a preceding chapter, and so we wish to make a few remarks on the latter.

It must be admitted that one of the greatest products of Asia was Shaka Muni and his religion, and also that the nation that has most fully assimilated that religious system and applied it to the exigencies of human life is neither India the land that gave him birth, nor China her eastern neighbor, nor Thibet, the hermit nation in which Buddhism has to-day the greatest influence, but Japan. On this point ample evidence is furnished by the Buddhist priest, Kawaguchi Ekai, who returned from Thibet last year, bringing information which has aroused the attention of the whole religious world. It was because he was not satisfied with Japanese Buddhism and had the hope of supplementing its deficiencies that he decided upon making his arduous pilgrimage. The six years he spent in that land were so filled with thrilling experiences that they remind us of Livingstone's adventures in Africa. But if we inquire what were the results of his investigations, we find that while he was able to unveil to the world many of the mysteries in the life and social customs of the Thibetans, he was sorely disappointed with what he found in their religious life. He discovered that both in theory and

in practice the Buddhism of Thibet was far inferior to that of Japan. While Japanese Buddhists were thus much disappointed that Thibet had no contribution to make to their religion, on the other hand it became plainer than ever that Buddhism has reached its highest development in Japan.

The other greatest Asiatic product is without question Confucius and his ethical system. Here also the palm belongs to Japan; for in deep penetration into his teachings and their practical application to life she has gone far in advance of China, the place of his birth and Corea her north-eastern neighbor.

The soul of the Japanese people has been fed on what is known as "*bushidō.*" This "*bushidō*" is the outgrowth of that spirit of loyalty and patriotism that have characterized the Japanese people from their earliest history, as it has been moulded and modified by both Buddhism and Confucianism. In "*bushidō*" the moral elements of both systems blend and bring forth their best fruit.

In the same way we may say that Japan has most thoroughly assimilated the best elements in Oriental law, literature and art as she has done in ethics and religion.

Thus Japan has come to understand the best in both Western and Eastern civilizations, and she ought to be able to do something towards harmonizing their various elements, and show how the excellencies of each may supply the deficiencies of the other. This surely is a part of Japan's heaven-appointed mission.

3.—To regenerate China and Corea.

I mention these two countries, because from ancient times Japan has held a peculiar relation to them. It is clear, of course, that the duty of regenerating the East is given to all the superior nations, but Japan has a special responsibility for the carrying out of this great work in China and Corea. In former times Japan was under as great obligation to China and Corea as she has in modern times been to Europe and America. In fact her civilization—viz, her learning, religion, political system, art and industry, up to the beginning of the present era, has largely come to her from China by way of Corea. As Japan has freely received of the best they themselves

possessed or had obtained elsewhere, so now she ought freely to give to them her best and the best she has obtained from her Western friends. Moreover in addition to close proximity geographically, the similarity of race, letters, customs and social religion in all three countries provide Japan with facilities for this great work of transformation not possessed by any Western nation, and therefore entail corresponding responsibilities, which constitute a distinct mission from which she dare not shrink.

4.—To Promote the Peace and Commerce of the East.

This of course is not the duty of Japan alone but of all the superior races, yet it must be admitted by every one that Japan has a special mission here. That Japan should be introduced to the world of the 19th century by America—whose national principles have been peace and commerce—is surely providential. The makers of New Japan began and continued *their* work under the inspiration of that spirit of

peace and commerce which animated Commodore Perry and Townsend Harris.

From her physical configuration and position Japan must be a commercial nation, if she would prosper at all. And without peace commerce is impossible. As insular England's mission has been the development of commerce with the continental nations of Europe and America, so must Japan's be with the continental nations of Asia.

To sum up, Japan has entered into an alliance with England for the purpose of promoting the peace of the Far East, and she has joined hands with America to promote their mutual commercial interests in Manchuria and Corea.

But this country with peace and commerce for her motto went to war with China ten years ago, and she is now engaged in a still mightier struggle with Russia. Where is her consistency? The answer is that by war, into which indeed, she has been led with great reluctance, she is seeking to remove the obstacles from the path of that peaceful commercial progress to which she feels herself destined. But this question we wish to treat more fully in the succeeding chapter.

FOURTH CHAPTER.

CHAPTER IV.

The Russo-Japanese War.

PART I.

Why Japan Decided to fight Russia.

Russia is a country fifty times the size of Japan, with three times her population, with an army five times as large and a stronger navy. Why then should Japan undertake to fight such a foe? Let us consider the main reasons.

1.—She fights for her own existence.

Russia's history in the Far East as in the West is one of encroachment. In 1858 she took advantage of China's being engaged in the Taiping rebellion to force China to cede all of

her territory north of the Amur River. And in 1860, when Peking was besieged by the English and French, Russia occupied the Manchurian coast line between the ocean and the Ussuri River.

From the time she took Kamtchatka nearly a hundred years ago she was looking with envious eyes upon Saghalin, and at last in 1875 when Japan was still young in foreign diplomacy contrived to wrest it from her hands, giving her Chijima in return, which however Japan for hundreds of years had always regarded as her own. Again in 1895 when Japan in the interest of Corean independence came off victorious in her war with China, and China ceded to her the Liaotung peninsula, Russia, backed by Germany and France stepped in and "on the ground that such permanent possession (of Liaotung) would be detrimental to the lasting peace of the Orient," prevented Japan from retaining this lawful spoil of war. The following year having obtained permission from China to build a railway through Manchuria, she at once, presumably to protect the railway, sent a large

military force which practically took possession of the above named territory; and under the pretence of securing merely a winter-harbor for her ships at Port Arthur, she in fact proceeded to construct one of the mightiest strongholds in the Far East as permanent headquarters for her navy, at the same time continually increasing the number of her warships in eastern waters. Again in 1900 at the time of the Boxer rising, when the different powers sent their troops to Peking to protect their ambassadors and nationals, Russia sent a large force into North China and Manchuria, making the solemn promise over and over again, that on the settlement of the Boxer difficulties she would gradually withdraw her troops. This she did once, but when the time for the second evacuation came, contrary to the reasonable expectations of all the powers, she not only did not withdraw her forces, but on various pretexts multiplied them, even occupying that sacred Chinese city of Mukden, and thus in fact became the ruler of Manchuria. Not satisfied with this, she even gave unmistakable evidence of her determined purpose to appropriate Corea also. At the time

of the Japan-China war, the Emperor of Corea temporarily obtained refuge in the Russian Legation in Seoul, and so in return for this favor Russia insisted on securing the concession of a large timber limit in the vicinity of the Yalu river. Here too she takes steps towards a permanent occupation with a view to making this an important harbor for herself to the exclusion of other nations. Not satisfied yet, it is reported that she by secret diplomacy seeks to obtain the important port of Mosampo in Southern Corea, and in this she is all but successful. If she had actually secured this Gibraltar of the Far East as she did Port Arthur, it would have been as if she had put her hand on the throat of Japan and hereafter Japan must forever be at her mercy. How could Japan possibly remain silent in the face of such encroachments? The Japanese Government therefore in June 1903 opened negotiations with Russia for a peaceful settlement of these serious difficulties, and with remarkable patience and self-control continued them up to the end of January 1904. But the manifest absence of a sincere desire on Russia's part for peace, and her undisguised and perpetual amass-

ing of both land and naval forces here in the Far East, at last cut off all possibility of a peaceful solution, and Japan was compelled on February 6th of this year to break off the negociations. A detailed account of the whole of these negociations may be seen in the Appendix.

2.—She Fights for the Integrity of China and Corea.

Japan has gone to war, as before stated for her national existence; but she is also fighting for the preservation of the integrity of both China and Corea, and the maintenance of the peace and commerce of the Orient. Japan's policy towards China is to conserve her territorial integrity, develope her national stength, promoting reforms in her internal administration, and in co-operation with Europe and America, to open her ports to the commerce of the world. Towards Corea, that unfortunate land that seems incapable of pursuing any consistent policy either

in her internal affairs or in her international relations, Japan, in view of the unique relationship subsisting between the two nations from ancient times, feels a responsibility for taking the lead in helping her weaker sister forward in the path of self-government and national progress. She cannot therefore view with unconcern the appropriation of strategic territory in these two neighboring states, nor the violation of their sovereignty and serious interference with their national development by that semi civilized despotism—Russia. It comes upon her as a personal and a social duty to fight Russia.

3.—She Fights for Oriental Peace and Commerce.

To those who have carefully followed the modern history of the Orient, it is evident that two forces have constantly been in conflict the one with the other—viz.—that free unrestricted international commerce for which America stands, and that never-ceasing encroachment upon neighboring states for which Russia is notorious.

It is perfectly clear that the issue of this struggle will in the near future fix the fate of the Orient, and extend its influence around the whole world. Look for a moment at the effect that must result if Russian aggression in China and Corea succeed. To Japan this could only mean the abandonment of commerce and everything else, and the absorption of all her energies in a tremendous military struggle for her very existence. Not only so, but even America which stands for a peaceful, commercial national policy, might be under the necessity of turning herself into a military nation. Then Japan would be placed in a position similar to that of Corea now, and America would be exchanging places with the Japan of to-day, so that the American merchant marine would have to be converted into men of war, and her merchants would have to turn soldiers.

Of necessity England would then have to increase her naval forces, likewise France and Germany and other powers, and it would eventuate that the great Pacific Ocean ordained of Heaven, as her name implies, to promote the peaceful progress of the world, would be con-

verted into a fearful deep of destruction of human life and property. In a word, as she goes to war with Russia, she stands forth as the champion of that peaceful commercial policy to which America is committed. It is therefore no matter of chance that Japan at this time has the sympathy of the American people.

4.—She Fights for the Reformation of Russia.

This will be the practical outcome of the war. It is under the guiding hand of a wise Providence that this war has been brought about. Doubtless outside the Christian church in Japan few see this far-reaching Providential purpose. In Russia herself while a minority will be doomed to a bitter disappointment, the great mass of the people weighed down with the burdens of taxation and oppression will hail with joy the blessings of constitutional government, freedom, popular education and enlightened progress which await them as the after-math of the war. Japan therefore, unconsciously to herself,

is being moved forward by that mysterious "Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness."

PART II.

The Issue of the War.

The forces which on both sides are likely to reach some 500,000 men each, have at last come to blows, but the question is—What will be the outcome of this fearful contest? The considerations which usually decide for victory or defeat in a war are the comparative strength of military arms, skill in military tactics, throughness of military discipline, and the numbers and courage of the combatants. But as yet it is not possible in this case to judge of these until after the war is over. So on these points I am ready to assume that the two are equally mated, and for the present I propose to look outside of these for reasons which go to show that the victory must be on the side of Japan.

1.—RIGHTEOUSNESS IS ON JAPAN'S SIDE.

Japan is fighting for her existence. Her people profoundly believe this. Many other nations also recognize it. She is moreover fighting for China and Corea and the peace of the Far East. This also her people profoundly believe, and it is so recognized among many other foreign nations.

She does not doubt that she is fighting the battle of righteousness, freedom and civilization.

2.—HER PEOPLE ARE THOROUGHLY UNITED IN THIS WAR.

At the time that war was finally declared, the Japanese nation presented a splendid spectacle to the world. Young and old were all united as one man, ready to go forth to battle. The press without one discordant note joined in one universal appeal to arms as the only arbiter of the the long continued dispute. All the political parties became loyal supporters of the Government's policy of war. When asked for war bonds to the amount of *yen* 100,000,000, the people responded with an offer of *yen* 450,000,000, and the Imperial Diet voted *yen* 580, 000,000 for war expenses, with absolute unanimity.

Many are the instances where both individuals and organizations have made extraordinary contributions to the war funds, but as the number is legion, we forbear to dwell upon them.

3.—Her naval victories.

Since the opening of the war, in spite of a few loses, she has seem a remarkable series of naval victories, which have given her practical control of the sea. She is herself surprissd at her own successes.

4.—She has the Sympathy of the World.

If the United States were the only foreign power that sympathized with us, it might be attributed to the fact that she was only doing the natural thing to be favorable to her own foster child. If England were our only sympathizer, it might be explained on the ground that we both have common interests in the East. But the United States and England are not the only powers which sympathize with us. In fact almost the whole world is on our side. Why is this? Because the nations believe that we are

fighting for our very existence as well as for civilization, humanity, liberty, and progress. These are surely in harmony with the will of that Divine Providence that rules over all, and as He enabled little Greece to defeat the mighty Persia of old, surely He will now give victory to little Japan.

The Duration of the War.

This may seem questionable as a reason for victory, for Russia indeed secretly relies upon time as her last resource in case all others should fail. But the facts, we believe, point the other way. Before the war began, delays counted in Russia's favor, but after once beginning, the prolongation of the war means advantage to Japan. For a war to last long means that the men and money employed are on a large scale. Russia's loss of sea power limits her ability to send reinforcements. The cost of war to her under such conditions must be at least five times as great as that of Japan. If it costs Japan $500,000 a day, it must cost Russia $ 2,500,000. From this alone it may be seen to which side the advantage will come by a long-continued war.

FIFTH CHAPTER.

CHAPTER V.

Japan's Burning Need.

From the consideration therefore of Japan's physical characteristics and her unique history ancient and modern, we have seen that she has certainly a contribution to make to the world's progress, and this will be made clearer than ever at the close of the present war. But the question we wish next to consider is—Can Japan fulfil this her heaven-appointed Mission, apart from that Christianity which has done so much to make Europe and America what they are? It is impossible to think that there is no need for us Japanese as a people to join the other nations in celebrating with joy the coming and the work of Jesus Christ. Just as Japan has appropriated the material side of Western civilization and grown strong thereby, just so has she need of assimilating the spiritual elements of that civilization to give character to her people. In other words it is only by becoming Christian that she can

fulfil her heaven appointed Mission. I wish to give a few reasons.

I.—Japan needs Christianity in order to make a right use of her political and educational institutions.

Constitutional government has been established, together with political parties. But in the actual working out of this system many grave defects are in plain evidence. If it be the fault of the Cabinet to have so frequently without sufficient reason dissolved the House of Representatives, on the other hand it must be admitted that the latter seems to have been actuated too much by the ambition of seizing the power swayed by the Cabinet and officialdom. Then educationalists while placing a high value upon intellectual culture, have not succeeded nourishing the moral sinews of our youth. In short Japanese statesmen and educators, while not of course wholly lacking in a sense of responsibility to and a feeling of reverence for their fellowmen and for Heaven, yet they are sadly defective in these fundamental

virtues that are so absolutely essential in a country having constitutional government and popular education. Buddhism and Shintoism do indeed in a degree promote the spirit of worship, but are void of moral power. This latter is found only in "Bushidō," which alas! is far from satisfying the great moral need of the nation. Dr. Nitobe, the author of "Bushidō, the Soul of Japan," after a learned eulogy of "Bushidō" and its influence upon Japanese morality, closes his discussion in the following pathetic words:—"Now its days are closing—sad to say, before its full fruition—and we turn in every direction for other sources of sweetness and light, of strength and comfort, but among them there is as yet nothing found to take its place. The profit and loss philosophy of Utilitarians and Materialists finds favor among logic-choppers with half a soul. The only other ethical system which is powerful enough to cope with Utilitarianism and Materialism is Christianity; but as yet it has not divested itself of foreign accoutrements."

The late Hon. Kenkichi Kataoka, for so many years the Speaker in the Japanese House of

Representatives, and himself a living embodiment of the best that is in "Bushidō," was wont repeatedly to say that it is no longer able to meet the moral needs of his countrymen, and that nothing but Christianity can.

2.—Japan needs Christianity in order to her Industrial and Commercial Development.

From ancient times the Japanese were an agricultural people, but they are fast becoming an industrial and commercial people. This is the tendency of the times, and it has a close relation to Japan's future destiny. While this is so, it is a lamentable fact that the people are sorely deficient in earnest application to toil and in business honesty. It is not so hard to secure the necessary capital for establishing banks and business companies, but it is tenfold harder to find trustworthy men to take charge of them. The bankruptcies of great firms which we hear of, are much less due to in sufficient business ability than to dishonesty. Unless Japan's busi-

ness men are morally renewed by the power of Christianity, there is no hope of her reaching any high place in the business and industrial world.

3.—Japan needs Christianity in order to successful colonization.

With an annual increase of about 500,000 souls she must seek an outlet for her surplus population in emigration to other lands. The Japanese having been accustomed for so many centuries to an insular life, so isolated from contact with other nations and being warmly attached to their local deities and the tombs of their ancestors, have a deep-seated dislike to going abroad. And so many of those who do go abroad do so simply because the struggle for existence in the home land has become intolerable, and far-off fields look green. They are therefore as a rule poor representatives of their country. If men of position, of capital and character are to be persuaded to leave their native shores to become permanent residents in foreign lands,

they must learn that there is but one God over all, our Father in heaven, who reveals himself to men everywhere who worship Him in spirit and in truth. Christianity alone can do this.

Conclusion.

Japan needs Christianity for her home life, her social life, and political life—indeed in every department of life. This is becoming increasingly clear, not only to those professing Christianity but to the thoughtful among all classes. In illustration we may cite the testimony of Baron Maejima and Count Okuma.

Baron Maejima has said:—"I firmly believe we must have religion as the basis of our national and personal welfare. No matter how large an army or navy we may have, unless we have righteousness at the foundation of our national existence we shall fall short of the highest success. I do not hesitate to say that we must rely upon religion for our highest welfare. And when I look about me to see what religion we may best rely upon, I am

convinced that the religion of Christ is the one most full of strength and promise for the nation."

Count Okuma has said:—"It is a question whether as a people we have not lost moral fiber as a result of the many new influences to which we have been subjected.—Development has been intellectual and not moral. The efforts which Christians are making to supply to the country a high standard of conduct are welcomed by all right thinking people. As you read your Bible you may think it is antiquated, out of date. The words it contains may so appear, but the noble life which it holds up to admiration is something that will never be out of date, however much the world may progress. Live and preach this life, and you will supply to the nation just what it needs at the present juncture."

Thus the stone which the builders rejected is becoming the corner stone of the nation.

There are two objects of Christian evangelization—first, the salvation of individual souls—second, through them, the salvation of the nation. We who are engaged in this work must ever be actuated by this double motive.

Japan has already for the sake of the peace

of the Far East formed an alliance with Great Britain; for the promotion of commerce in Manchuria and Korea she has joined hands with America.

This is surely a wise policy and a great diplomatic success. But to the complete fulfilment of her whole heaven-assigned Mission, she must form an alliance with the Kingdom of God and be brought into sympathetic touth with Jesus Christ. May we not ask that our brethren of the other nations join us Japanese in repeating from our hearts that we may realize in our lives the ideal prayer for universal man.—"Our Father which art in heaven, Hallowed be they name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread. And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors. And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil:—For thine is the kingdom, and the power and the glory, forever." Amen.

APPENDIX.

I. Correspondence containg the negotiations between Japan and Russia.

II. Responsibility for the War.

(In the belief that the bare facts stated will emply justify the course which Japan took, I add this Appendix.)

I

Correspondence Regarding the Negotiations Between Japan and Russia.

No. 1.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, July 28th, 1903.

The Japanese Government have observed with close attention the development of affairs in Manchuria, and they view with grave concern the present situation there. So long as there were grounds for hope that Russia would carry out her engagement to China and her assurances to other Powers on the subject of the evacuation of Manchuria, the Japanese Government maintained an attitude of watchful reserve. But the recent action of Russia in formulating new demands in Peking and in consolidating rather than relaxing her hold on Manchuria compels belief that she has abandoned the intention of returning from Manchuria, while her increased activity along the Korean frontier is such as to raise doubts regarding the limits of her ambition. The unrestrained permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia would create a condition of things prejudicial to the security and interest of Japan. Such occupation would be destructive of the principle of equal opportunity and in impairment of the territorial integrity of China. But, what is of still more serious moment to the Japanese Government, Russia stationed on the flank of Korea would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that Empire, and in any event it would make Russia the dominant power in Korea. Korea is an important outpost in Japan's line of defence, and Japan consequently considers the independence of Korea absolutely essential to her own repose and

safety. Japan possesses paramount political as well as commercial and industrial interests and influence in Korea, which, having regard to her own security, she cannot consent to surrender to, or share with, any other Power. The Japanese Government have given the matter their most serious consideration and have resolved to approach the Russian Government in a spirit of conciliation and frankness with a view to the conclusion of an understanding designed to compose questions which are at this time the cause of just and natural anxiety; and in the estimation of the Japanese Government, the moment is opportune for making the attempt to bring about the desired adjustment.

The Japanese Government, reposing confidence in your judgment and discretion, have decided to place these delicate negotiations in your hands. It is the wish of the Japanese Government to place their present invitation to the Russian Government entirely on an official footing, and you are accordingly instructed to open the question by presenting to Count Lamsdorff a Note Verbale to the following effect:—

"The Imperial Japanese Government, believing that the Imperial Russian Government share with them the desire to remove from the relations of the two Empires every cause of future misunderstanding, would be glad to enter with the Imperial Russian Government upon examination of the condition of affairs in the Extreme East where their interests meet, with a view to a definition of their respective special interests in those regions. If, as is confidently hoped, this suggestion meets approval in principle, the Imperial Japanese Government will be prepared to present to the Imperial Russian Government their views as to the nature and scope of the proposed understanding."

In presenting the foregoing note to Count Lamsdorff, you will be careful to make him understand that our purposes are entirely friendly, but that we attach great importance to the subject You will present the note to Count Lamsdorff as soon as possible, and keep me fully informed regarding the steps taken by you under this instrucion; and immediately *upon the receipt* of an affirmative reply from the Russian

Government, the substance of our proposals will be telegraphed to you.

No. 2.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, July 31st, 1903.
Received, August 2nd, „

Your Excellency's telegram of the 28th instant, was duly received. In accordance with the instructions contained therein, I saw Count Lamsdorff to-day and before handing to His Excellency the Note Verbale, I stated substantially as follows:—

The condition of affairs in the Far East is becoming more and more complicated, and unless something be done at present with the view of removing all cause of misunderstanding between Japan and Russia, the relations of the two countries will increase in difficulty, entailing nothing but disadvantage to both countries. Under the circumstances, the Imperial Government, fully animated by a spirit of frankness and conciliation, have decided to approach the Imperial Russian Government with a view to arrive at an understanding.

I then handed to him the Note Verbale, saying that I was so instructed. After he had seen it, I expressed my ardent hope that the Russian Government would share the above view in the same spirit. Count Lamsdorff said that he was perfectly satisfied with the decision of the Japanese Government, for, as he had said to me very often, an understanding between the two countries is not only desirable, but is the best policy; should Russia and Japan enter into full understanding, no one would in future attempt to sow the seeds of discord between the two countries. So far as he was concerned, he was, he said, in perfect accord with the view of the Japanese Government; but he wished to see the Emperor on the subject before a definite answer was given. He expects to see the Emperor next Tuesday, and promised to give me an answer on the following day. He added that the Emperor would surely approve the matter.

No. 3.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, August 3rd, 1903.

In reference to my telegram of the 28th July, the Japanese Government, after giving most serious consideration to the condition of affairs in those centres where the interests of the two Powers meet, have decided to propose the following as the basis of an understanding between Japan and Russia.

" 1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean Empires and to maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in those countries.

" 2. Reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and of the right of Japan to take in Korea and of Russia to take in Manchuria such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their respective interests as above defined, subject, however, to the provisions of Article I of the Agreement.

" 3. Reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and Japan not to impede development of those industrial and commercial activities respectively of Japan in Korea and of Russia in Manchuria, which are not inconsistent with the stipulations of Article I of this Agreement.

' Additional engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the Korean railway into southern Manchuria so as to connect with the East China and Shan-hai kwan Newchwang lines.

" 4. Reciprocal engagement that in case it is found necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Russia to Manchuria, for the purpose either of protecting the interests mentioned in Article II of this Agreement, or of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create international complications, the troops so sent are in no case to exceed the actual number required and are to be forthwith recalled as soon as their missions are accomplished.

"*5. Recognition* on the part of Russia of the exclusive right

of Japan to give advice and assistance in the interest of reform and good government in Korea, including necessary military assistance.

"6. This Agreement to supplant all previous arrangements between Japan and Russia respecting Korea."

In handing the foregoing project to Count Lamsdorff, you will say that it is presented for the consideration of the Russian Government in the firm belief that it may be found to serve as a basis upon which to construct satisfactory arrangements between the two Governments, and you will assure Count Lamsdorff that any amendment or suggestion he may find it necessary to offer will receive the immediate and friendly consideration of the Japanese Government. It will not be necessary for you to say much in elucidation of the separate items of the project as they are very largely self explanatory; but you might point out that the project taken as a whole will be found to be but little more than the logical and essential development and extension of the principles already recognized by the two Governments, or of conditions embodied in the engagements which the project is designed to supplant.

The foregoing instruction is sent to you in anticipation that the answer to the Note Verbale presented by you will be favourable; but you will not act on that instruction until you receive further instructions which will be given after you have communicated to me the answer to the Note Verbale.

No. 4.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram) Petersburg, August 5th, 1903.
Received, „ 6th, „

Count Lamsdorff says he is authorized by the Emperor to open negotiations with me on the subject of the Note Verbale.

No. 5.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, August 6th, 1903.

In reference to your telegrams dated the 1st and 5th instant, you will state to Count Lamsdorff that the Imperial

Government fully appreciate the friendly spirit with which the Russian Government received the proposal of the Japanese Government to enter upon negotiations with regard to an understandi g between the two countries, and then present at once the project to the Russian Government in accordance with instructions contained in my telegram of the 1st instant.

No. 6.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, August 12th, 1903.
Received, „ 14th, „

Count Lamsdorff, being now very much occupied, could not receive me until to-day, when I handed to His Excellency the proposed project in English in accordance with your instructions. I added that the longer the conclusion of an accord is postponed the more difficult will it become, as the condition of affairs in the Far East is now getting more and more complicated. I asked him to hasten the matter as much as possible. He said he would examine the project with care.

No. 7.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg August 24th, 1903.
Received, „ 25th, „

Count Lamsdorff received me yesterday by special arrangement, and I asked his views as well as the attitude of the Russian Government regarding our proposals, adding that the Japanese Government are now impatiently waiting for a reply. He said that he had studied the project seriously, but that the Emperor having been absent over a week on account of the manœuvres, he had been unable to take any steps in the matter; but he asked my opinion about transferring the negotiations to Tokio as there were many details which would have to be referred to Admiral Alexieff I said to him that the Japanese Government having confided the matter to *me*, I should prefer to proceed with it, but that I was willing *to communicate his* opinion to you.

He stated that he has already sent copy of our project to Port Arthur with the view of obtaining the opinion of Admiral Alexieff. After such conversation, he said the question of Japanese railway enterprise in Manchuria would be difficult, but upon all other points perhaps the Russian Government would be able to come to an understanding. I said that in order to arrive at a satisfactory understanding, mutual concessions as well as a spirit of conciliation are necessary and that the Japanese Government would be prepared to give favourable consideration if any suggestions should be made by Count Lamsdorff.

No. 8.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, August 26th, 1903.

In reference to your telegram of 24th instant, you will say to Count Lamsdorff that the Japanese Government would prefer to continue negotiations in St. Petersburg, believing that by so doing, the work will be greatly facilitated. You can add that there are no details to be considered in connection with pending negotiations, which require local knowledge and that the Japanese Government, having placed the negotiation in your hands would dislike to make any change. You will say to Count Lamsdorff that the Japanese Government are anxiously awaiting a definite reply from his Government to their proposals, and you will continue to use every endeavour to obtain from him such a reply as soon as possible.

No. 9.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg August 27th, 1903.
Received, , 28th, ,,

I saw Count Lamsdorff to-day on the subject of your telegram dated the 26th instant. He said he had audience of the Emperor last Tuesday, and was told that His Majesty desires very much the early conclusion of an *entente* satisfactory for both countries, and expressed his wish to conduct the negotiations at Tokio so as to expedite the matter. Then Count

Lamsdorff added that the Emperor is to leave here for the country next Monday, and then for foreign countries for some time, and at the same the Ministers concerned would be absent from St. Petersburg. Consequently, negotiations in Tokio would be much the easier and quicker way of concluding the matter. I said, referring to my conversation with Count Lamsdorff of the 23rd instant, that the proposed understanding involved mostly questions of principles and politics rather than details, and consequently that the continuation of negotiations at St. Petersburg would be proper and at the same time the quickest way to arrive at a satisfactory understanding. He repeated what he had just said and insisted upon his proposition.

Under the circumstances, I think it hardly possible to change the course now proposed by Count Lamsdorff under authority of the Emperor. I also think that negotiations at Tokio would entail many disadvantageous consequences; and definite instruction for the further course is awaited.

No. 10.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, August 20th, 1903.

In reference to your telegram of the 27th instant, you will say to Count Lamsdorff that the Japanese Government still think that negotiation will be facilitated if continued in St. Petersburg since the negotiations relate to principles and not details; and you will add that he and you having been duly authorized in the matter and the proposals of Japan having been presented to him, the Japanese Government had supposed that the seat of negotiation had been agreed to. You will accordingly urge upon Count Lamsdorff the desire of the Japanese Government to continue the negotiations in St. Petersburg and express a hope that his Government will reconsider the question. You will also say that the Japanese Government presume they are justified in assuming from the proposal to transfer negotiations to Tokio, that our proposals are in principle acceptable to the Russian Government as the basis of

'iations,

No. 11.

Mr. Kurino to Baron Komura.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, August 31st, 1903.
Received, September 2nd, 1903.

I saw Count Lamsdorff to-day and explained fully the purport of your telegram of the 29th instant. The substance of his reply is as follows:

He said that the negotiations relate to principles, but principles must be decided upon examination of local and practical questions. Accordingly the Russian Government desired to transfer the discussions to Tokio on account of the necessity of consultation with Admiral Alexieff, and also to manifest a sense of deference to Japan as the proposal had been made by her, and that the acceptance of the proposal at St. Petersburg does not signify that the seat of negotiations should be at the same place. He added that the proposal to transfer the negotiations to Tokio does not necessarily mean that our proposals are acceptable to the Russian Government, as bases for negotiations could not be determined without reference to practical questions concerning which Baron Rosen and Admiral Alexieff have much better knowledge than he himself.

I urged as my opinion that this being the most important question of high politics between our two countries, perhaps the Emperor had much to decide, and consequently it would be very convenient if the negotiations were conducted at St. Petersburg, and wished his serious reconsideration of the question of transfer as such reconsideration is much desired by the Japanese Government. I objected also to the suggestion of transfer on the ground that the question relates to principle as well as to the direction of international political concerns which may not be within the powers conferred upon Admiral Alexieff. If I remember rightly, I said, I understand that his authority is limited to mere questions of local administration. He said that on this question Admiral Alexieff would only be consulted and decide nothing and added that he, Count Lamsdorff, is also desirous to settle the question as quickly as possible, and that is the reason why he suggested the transfer.

The Russian Counter-proposals are being prepared by persons having local knowledge, consequently the transfer of negotiations to Tokio would expedite the matter. Should the negotiations be conducted at St. Petersburg, he would be obliged to attend to the matter personally with me; but this autumn he has to be long absent from the city on account of his attendance upon the Emperor. In case of his journey to Vienna and Rome, he may also visit a certain foreign country and would be liable to be frequently interrupted in the negotiations. But in case of negotiations at Tokio, he could direct them by telegraph, and telegrams from Tokio could always follow him wherever he might happen to be; besides, he said as we know very well, the Russian way of conducting business here is not very expeditious. At the conclusion, he said he is to have audience of the Emperor to-day, and will explain to him the reasons why an early understanding between the two countries is desirable as mentioned by me; and he promised to repeat to His Majesty the special desire of the Japanese Government to conduct the negotiations at St. Petersburg; but he added that no change of view on the subject could be expected.

No. 12.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram) Tokio, September 2nd, 1903.

In reference to your telegram of the 31st ultimo you will say to Count Lamsdorff that it being the acknowledged desire of both Powers to arrive at an understanding as soon as possible, the Japanese Government fear that discussions would be greatly protracted if the negotiations were now to be transferred to Tokio without some accepted basis for negotiation; and you will add that the Japanese Government, having presented their proposals in concrete form to the Russian Government believe that negotiations, wherever conducted, would be greatly facilitated if the Russian Government were primarily to announce whether such proposals can in principle be accepted as the basis for negotiations. The Japanese Government *do not* understand that the acceptance of those proposals

as such basis would exclude amendments that might be regarded as necessary. On the contrary, such acceptance would merely fix a definite point of departure which is desirable in all negotiations and very important in the present case. You will use every endeavour to secure the desired announcement from the Russian Government.

No. 13.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) St. Petersburg, Sept. 5th, 1903.
Received, „ 6th, „

I saw Count Lamsdorff yesterday. With the view of preventing any misunderstanding about the sense of the instruction contained in your telegram of the 2nd instant and also with the view of impressing upon the Russian Government the feeling of importance placed by the Japanese Government on the matter, I prepared a Note Verbale which I handed to him. We then had a rather prolonged discussion on the question. The substance of his remarks is as follows:

According to his experience of 40 years in the Foreign Office, negotiations of an international character had always been conducted on the proposals of one Power together with the reply of the other, and it was not usual to accept the proposition of one as the sole basis of negotiations. Baron Rosen had already been commanded by the Emperor to study seriously the proposition of the Japanese Government, and at the same time to prepare and elaborate Counter-Proposals in consultation with Admiral Alexieff, and, if the Japanese Government were willing to enter into negotiation, to commence immediately the *pourparlers* adopting the propositions of the Japanese Government and the Russian Counter-Proposals as the basis of negotiations. I said during the discussion that if the Russian Government were really animated by a desire to enter into a satisfactory arrangement with Japan, I should deem it highly necessary that the Russian Government should instruct their negotiators to adopt as the basis the Japanese proposals, or at least the essential principles thereof so as to

facilitate the attainment of the object of the negotiation, for I am inclined to doubt if Admiral Alexieff is disposed to enter into negotiations with Japan in a spirit of conciliation which is of prime necessity in order to arrive at a satisfactory understanding. He said that when he received our project there were only two courses open for Russia to take, either to reject our proposals or to enter into negotiations on them. The Russian Government have adopted the latter course; this does not, however, signify acceptance of our project in its entirety or in principle; but having agreed to the proposition to enter into an *entente*, they have decided to examine the propositions and to prepare Counter-Proposals so that the two might be used as the basis of negotiations. Besides, he said that in our project there are certain clauses which could not be reconciled with Russian interests, and others which require modifications; and he could not say that the Russian Government accepted our proposals even in principle as basis, but only in conjunction with their Counter-Proposals.

Having exhausted every effort for the attainment of the desire of the Japanese Government, I am now fully convinced that it will not be possible to change the course proposed by Count Lamsdorff; and I think that there is no other way for Japan but to agree to his suggestion. Count Lamsdorff is to leave here on the 10th instant for Darmstadt to attend the Emperor of Russia.

No. 14.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, September 9th, 1903.

In reference to your telegram of the 5th instant, you are hereby instructed to inform Count Lamsdorff that the Japanese Government consent to transfer negotiations to Tokio, and you will add that the Japanese Government trust that instructions to the Russian Minister at Tokio are of such a character as to enable him to present the Russian Counter-Proposals without delay and to proceed immediately with the negotiations.

No. 15.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, September 9th, 1903.
Received, „ 10th, „

I saw Count Lamsdorff to-day. He said Baron Rosen and Admiral Alexieff have already been instructed by telegraph, by order of the Emperor, to prepare the Counter-Proposals as quickly as possible and to commence negotiations at the earliest date, and he does not think it necessary to repeat the same instruction.

No. 16.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, September 24th, 1903.

Baron Rosen left Tokio on the 22nd instant for Port Arthur. Previously to his departure, he called on me and told me that he had been instructed under Imperial order some time ago to hold himself ready to start at once for Port Arthur, whenever necessity might arise to do so, in order to expedite the preparation of the Russian Counter-Proposals between Admiral Alexieff and himself, and that he had just received from the Admiral a request to repair to Port Arthur for personal consultation on the subject. He added that he expected to come back within about eleven days.

No. 17.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, October 5th, 1903.

Baron Rosen came back to Tokio on the 3rd inst. He called on me on the same day and handed to me the following as the Russian Counter-Proposals, which, he said, was sanctioned by the Emperor of Russia, upon joint presentation by Admiral Alexieff and himself:—

1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Corean Empire.

2. Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests in Corea and of the right of Japan to give advice and assistance to Corea tending to improve the civil

administration of the Empire without infringing the stipulations of Article I.

3. Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the commercial and industrial undertakings of Japan in Corea, nor to oppose any measures taken for the purpose of protecting them so long as such measures do not infringe the stipulations of Article I.

4. Recognition of the right of Japan to send for the same purpose troops to Corea, with the knowledge of Russia, but their number not to exceed that actually required, and with the engagement on the part of Japan to recall such troops as soon as their mission is accomplished.

5. Mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Corea for strategical purposes nor to undertake on the coasts of Corea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Corea.

6. Mutual engagement to consider that part of the territory of Corea lying to the north of the 39th parallel as a neutral zone into which neither of the Contracting Parties shall introduce troops.

7. Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as in all respects outside her sphere of interest.

8. This Agreement to supplant all previous Agreements between Russia and Japan respecting Corea.

No. 18.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram) Tokio, October 8th, 1903.

In reference to my telegram of the 5th instant, I have begun discussion with the Russian Minister to Japan taking our proposals and the Russian Counter-Proposals as the basis and with a view to secure, if possible, the recognition by Russia of the fundamental principles laid down in our proposals.

No. 19.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, October 16th, 1903.

In reference to my telegram of the 8th instant, negotiations

are now going on between Baron Rosen and myself regarding the following proposals, which I had presented as amendment to the Russian Counter-Proposals :—

Article II. Insert the phrase "including military assistance" between "assistance" and "to Corea." Change the word "civil" into "internal."

Article III. Insert the phrase "the development of" between "impede" and "the commercial." "Undertakings" to be changed into "activities," and "taken" into "to be taken" and "them" into "those interests."

Article IV. Recognition of the right of Japan to send troops to Corea for the purpose mentioned in the preceding Article or for the purpose of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create international complications.

Article VI. Mutual engagement to establish a neutral zone on the Corea-Manchuria frontier extending.....kilometres on each side, into which neutral zone neither of the Contracting Parties shall introduce troops without the consent of the other.

Article VII. To be struck out and replaced by the following three Articles :—

VII. Engagement on the part of Russia to respect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity in Manchuria and not to interfere with Japan's commercial freedom in Manchuria.

VIII. Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Manchuria and of the right of Russia to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of those interests so long as such measures do not infringe the stipulations of the preceding Article.

IX. Mutual engagement not to impede the connection of Corean railway and the East China railway when those railways shall have been eventually extended to the Yalu.

Article VIII of the Russian Counter-Proposals to be numbered Article X.

No. 20.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, October 22nd, 1903.

The result of discussions between Baron Rosen and myself

on our amendments to the Russian Counter-Proposals is as follows: –

Amendments to Articles II and VI accepted *ad referendum*, Article III accepted, and Article IV reserved for further discussion. It is in Article VII of our amendment to Article VII of the Russian Counter-proposals that no agreement could be reached, each insisting on the impossibility of accepting the other's proposition. The contention of the Russian Minister is:—1st, that the Russian Article VII is the only compensation to Russia for the concessions to be made by her in respect of Corea; and 2nd, that admission of the Japanese amendments on this point would be contrary to the principle always insisted on by Russia that the question concerning Manchuria is one exclusively for Russia and China admitting of no interference on the part of any third Power.

Our contention is:—1st, that Japan does not ask for any concession from Russia with respect to Manchuria, her proposal being simply to have confirmed in the Agreement the principle which has been voluntarily and repeatedly declared by Russia; and 2nd, that Japan possesses in Manchuria her treaty rights and commercial interests and she must obtain from Russia a guarantee for the security of those rights and interests as well as of the independence of Corea which would be constantly menaced by Russia's definitive occupation of Manchuria.

No. 21.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, October 29th, 1903.

In reference to my telegram of the 22nd instant, as the result of further discussions, the amendment on Article IV was finally accepted *ad referendum*. Regarding Article VI, my proposal of fixing the extent of the neutral zone at 50 kilometres on each side of the frontier was accepted *ad referendum*. As to Article VII, no agreement could yet be reached.

No. 22.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, October 30th.

I presented to Baron Rosen on the 30th instant the follow-

ing as definite amendments of the Imperial Government to the Russian Counter-Proposals :—

1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Corean Empires.

2. Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests in Corea and of the right of Japan to give to Corea advice and assistance including military assis'ance tending to improve the administration of the Corean Empire.

3. Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the development of the commercial and industrial activities of Japan in Corea, nor to oppose any measures taken for the purpose of protecting those interests.

4. Recognition by Russia of the right of Japan to send troops to Corea for the purpose mentioned in the preceding Article or for the purpose of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create international complications.

5. Engagement on the part of Japan not to undertake on the coasts of Corea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Corea.

6. Mutual engagement to establish a neutral zone on the Corea-Manchuria frontier extending 50 kilometres on each side, into which neutral zone neither of the Contracting Parties shall introduce troops without the consent of the other.

7. Recognition by Japan that Manchuria is outside her sphere of special interest and recognition by Russia that Corea is outside her sphere of special interest.

8. Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Manchuria and of the right of Russia to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of those interests.

9. Engagement on the part of Japan not to interfere with the commercial and residential rights and immunities belonging to Russia in virtue of her treaty engagements with Corea, and engagement on the part of Russia not to interfere with the commercial and residential rights and immunities belonging to Japan in virtue of her treaty engagements with China.

10. Mutual engagement not to impede the connexion of

the Corean railway and the East-China railway when those railways shall have been eventually extended to the Yalu.

11. This Agreement to supplant all previous Agreements between Japan and Russia respecting Corea.

No. 23.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, Novemher 1st, 1903.

Baron Rosen called on me October 31st and stated that the definite proposals which I presented to him as amendments to the Russian proposals as reported in my telegram of the 30th October were beyond his instructions and that he would, November 1st, telegraph the full text of the said proposals to his Government and ask for further instructions. Accordingly you are instructed to see as soon as possible the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the absence of Count Lamsdorff, and say to him that in preparing the proposals in question, the Japanese Government did not fail to take into full consideration the wishes of the Russian Government. You will inform him that in proposing a joint engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China, equally with Corea, the Japanese Government were merely asking a reaffirmation of declarations already spontaneously made by Russia, and when it is considered that Russia is prepared to make such an engagement respecting Corea, the reason for excluding China is not understood. The Japanese Government are prepared to admit that the Manchurian question, so far as it does not affect their rights and interest, is purely a Russo-Chinese question; but Japan has extensive and important rights and interest in that region, and the Japanese Government think that in declaring that Manchuria is outside their sphere of special interest, they are at least entitled to ask for a correlative engagement on the part of Russia not to interfere with the commercial and residential right and immunities belonging to Japan in virtue of her treaty engagements with China. You will in addition point out that the invitation of the Japanese Government which originated the present *negotiations*, had in view a definition of the special interest of

Japan and Russia in those regions of the Far East where the interests of the two Powers meet. The Japanese Government could not have anticipated that the Russian Government, in accepting that invitation, would wish—as might be inferred from Article VII of their Counter-Proposals,—to restrict the proposed definition exclusively to the region in which Japan possesses special interests.

No. 24.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, November 3rd, 1903.
Received, „ „ „

I saw the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 2nd November. He said, as his personal opinion, that Japan is making the same demands only in different form and that those demands are too great. I asked in what respects the Japanese Government are considered to be demanding too much, and I added that we do not ask anything more than the recognition of existing treaty rights and immunities of Japan in Manchuria. He then stated that Baron Rosen had said nothing on the subject. The only difficulty, he said, is the connection of the Corean and Manchurian railways. To my question whether there are no other difficulties, he answered that the railway question is the only difficulty, although it had been accepted *ad referendum;* and in conclusion I asked him to use his best influence for the satisfactory solution of the question, as the Japanese Government are fully animated by the spirit of conciliation, and I urged him to advise Count Lamsdorff in the same sense and if possible, to approach the Emperor of Russia on the question. He said that he is willing to do so, and added that Count Lamsdorff will return at the end of this week.

No. 25.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, November 13th, 1903.
Received „ „ „

I saw Count Lamsdorff November 12th, and asked whether he had received a copy of the telegram which I had handed

to Prince Obolensky and whether any action had been taken in the matter. He answered that he had submitted the telegram to the Emperor, and that before his departure from Darmstadt, he sent under an Imperial order instructions to Baron Rosen to continue negotiations with the Japanese Government. I asked him whether it is on the basis of our last proposal that Baron Rosen was instructed to go on negotiating. Count Lamsdorff said that Baron Rosen had been ordered by the Emperor to examine our last proposal with Admiral Alexieff and to make modification if necessary, and added that at this moment Baron Rosen and Admiral Alexieff must be engaged in the preparation of Counter-Proposals. I remarked to Count Lamsdorff that according to the view of Prince Obolensky, the connection of Corean and Manchurian railways is the question that devides the two Governments; but the Japanese Government having subsequently modified the article relating to the question, I cannot believe that it is the principal point on which an agreement can not be established. Count Lamsdorff replied that he thinks for his part that it is the Manchurian question which divides the two parties, as he had said from the very beginning the Russian Government consider always that this question is a question exclusively between Russia and China, and it must be reserved to his Government to take all proper measures to safeguard their very considerable interests in Manchuria by means of an arrangement with China. I explained to him that Japan is ever ready to recognize the special and considerable interests which Russia has in Manchuria, and that she has no intention whatever of trespassing upon them but that Japan has a perfect right to demand that the independence and territorial integrity of China shall be respected and the rights and the interests of Japan in that region shall be formally guaranteed. Count Lamsdorff answered that the objection relates to the form rather than the substance of the proposals. In Manchuria other Powers also have rights and interests, and Russia cannot enter into special arrangement with each of those Powers regarding Manchuria. *I observed that* should the Russian Government be in accord

with Japan in principle, it is deeply to be regretted that an understanding cannot be reached, merely because of failure to find a suitable formula by which to bring the two Governments to an arrangements and that I could not but ardently ask him to use his influence to bring about a satisfactory solution according to the principles already admitted by Russia.

No. 26.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, November 21st, 1903.

Baron Rosen informed me November 20th, that he received a telegram November 14th from Admiral Alexieff to the effect that Admiral Alexieff had already forwarded the Counter-Proposals to St. Petersburg. Baron Rosen added that he had not yet received any instructions on the subject of the Counter-Proposals. Consequently you are instructed to see Count Lamsdorff as soon as posible, and after explaining to him Baron Rosen's statements as above, you will say that the Japanese Government are anxious to proceed with the negotiations with all possible expedition; and you will urge him to exert his influence to secure the early dispatch of instructions to Baron Rosen in order that the negotiations may be resumed and concluded without delay.

No. 27.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, November 22nd, 1903.
Received, „ 23rd, „

I saw Count Lamsdorff on the 22nd November. He said that the modifications are already in the hands of the Emperor; but on account of the illness of the Empress, the former does not attend to any business affairs; hence the delay. I asked him to use his endeavours to obtain the earliest possible Imperial order on the question. He said in reply that it will be better for me to write him a note giving the purport of instructions I have received from you; then he will immediately send it to the Emperor. At the end of the conversation I asked whether it is not possible for me to get some information about the modifications proposed by Admiral

Alexieff. He seemed rather puzzled to give a direct answer; but he said that the Russian Government are ready to enter into immediate agreement with Japan regarding Corea, even making large concessions, but as to Manchuria, Russia once took possession of the country by right of conquest; nevertheless, she is willing to restore it to China, but with certain guarantees assuring security to the enormous interests which Russia has in Manchuria. While China is still insisting upon her refusal to give such guarantees, it is not possible for Russia to come to any arrangement with a third Power respecting Manchuria, as the question is exclusively between the two countries concerned. Then I said that if I accurately judge the nature of our proposition, it is not the intention of the Japanese Government to interfere with direct negotiations between the two Governments concerned as may be seen from the first part of Article VII of our last proposition; but we only wish the independence and integrity of China as repeatedly declared on the part of Russia and security for our important interests in that province. This is not for the purpose of interfering with the affairs of the two Powers concerned, but only to prevent misunderstanding between Russia and Japan regarding the province where both Powers have some interest; and I added that if in principle such an *entente* could in some form or other be arrived at, perhaps even negotiations between Russia and China might be more easily carried out. He thereupon repeated his request for me to write him a note as above mentioned, and that I should add my own opinion in it, and that he would immediately send it to the Emperor. He told me that he expects to have audience on the 25th November at Skernevice and that the note could be sent to him towards this evening. I judge from the tone of Count Lamsdorff's conversation that the modification proposed by Admiral Alexieff will not be favourable to our proposition regarding China and Manchuria.

No. 28.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, November 28th, 1903.

You report in your telegram of November 22nd that Count

Lamsdorff expected to have audience of the Emperor on the 25th instant. Accordingly you are instructed to see Count Lamsdorff as soon as possible and ask him what action has been taken regarding further instructions to Baron Rosen.

No. 29.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, November 27th, 1903.
Received, „ 28th, „

Count Lamsdorff told me he did not see the Emperor November 25th, on account of the sickness of the Empress. Interior inflammation of her right ear has necessitated an operation. He said that he immediately despatched to the Emperor my note mentioned in my telegram of November 22nd.

No. 30.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, December 1st, 1903.

The Japanese Government have from the first attached the highest importance to a speedy solution of the question which form at this time the subject of negotiations between Japan and Russia. It seemed to them that in a matter of such vital moment as that which engages the attention of the Cabinets of Tokio and St. Petersburg, a quick conclusion was only second in importance to a satisfactory conclusion. Consistently with that view the Japanese Government have at all times during the progress of the negotiations made it a special point to give prompt answers to all propositions of the Russian Government. The negotiations have now been pending for no less than four months, and they have not yet reached a stage where the final issue can with certainty be predicted. In these circumstances the Japanese Government cannot but regard with grave concern the situation for which the delays in negotiations are largely responsible. You are instructed to see Count Lamsdorff as soon as possible and place the foregoing considerations before him in such form and manner as to make your representations as impressive as possible. You will add that the Japanese Government believe they are

rendering service to the general interest in thus frankly explaining to the Russian Government the actual state of things.

No. 31.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, December 2nd, 1093.
„ Received, „ 3rd, „

I heard that the Russian Government are still repeatedly communicating with Admiral Alexieff.

No. 32.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, December 4th, 1903.
Received, „ „ „

Count Lamsdorff received me on the night of December 3rd. I handed him a French translation of your telegram of December 1st together with a letter which I addressed to him expressing fully the pressing situation under which the Japanese Government are now labouring. He said that the question requires consideration still, and he is in communication with Admiral Alexieff; but the Emperor is to return December 5th, and he said that he will fully explain the urgency of the matter on the occasion of his audience on the following Tuesday. He thinks he will then be able to send instructions to Baron Rosen. To my question whether it is not possible for him to have audience at an earlier date, he said that Saturday is the fête of Crown Prince, no business is transacted on Sunday, and he will be occupied with other affairs on Monday. He promised to let me know the result of his audience next Wednesday.

No. 33.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, December 9th, 1903.
Received, „ 10th „

Count Lamsdorff told me December 9th that an Imperial order had been sent yesterday to Admiral Alexieff and Baron Rosen to continue the negotiations in accordance with the

Counter-Proposals of Admiral Alexieff, but that the Japanese propositions have been fully considered. I asked whether he could inform me of the nature of the propositions on which Baron Rosen is authorized to continue the negotiations. He said that they will be officially communicated within two or three days through Baron Rosen to the Japanese Government.

No. 34.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, December 12th, 1903.

Baron Rosen called on me December 11th and under instructions of his Government, officially presented to me the following Counter-Proposals of the Russian Government in reply to our definitive amendments as stated in my telegram of October 30th:—

1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Corean Empire.

2. Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests in Corea and of the right of Japan to assist Corea with advice tending to improve the civil administration.

3. Engagement on the part of Russia not to oppose the development of the industrial and commercial activities of Japan in Corea, nor the adoption of measures for the protection of those interests.

4. Recognition by Russia of the right of Japan to send troops to Corea for the purpose mentioned in the preceding Article, or for the purpose of suppressing insurrections or disorders capable of creating international complications.

5. Mutual engagement not to make use of any part of the Corean territory for strategical purposes and not to undertake on the Corean coast any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Corea.

6. Mutual engagement to consider the territory of Corea to the north of the 39th parallel as a neutral zone, within the limits of which neither of the Contracting Parties shall introduce troops.

7. Mutual engagement not to impede the connection of

the Corean and East China Railways, when those railways shall have been extended to the Yalu.

8. Abrogation of all previous Agreements between Russia and Japan respecting Corea.

No. 35.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, December 21st, 1903.

In an interview with the Russian Minister, December 21st, I pointed out the fundamental difference in territorial compass between Japan's original proposals and Russia's new Counter-Proposals, and after fully explaining the reason which induced the Japanese Government to believe it to be desirable in the general interest to include in the proposed understanding all regions in the Extreme East where the interests of the two Empires meet, I expressed the hope that the Russian Government would reconsider their position regarding that branch of the question. I also informed him fully respecting the amendments which Japanese Government consider it necessary to introduce into Russia's new Counter-Proposals. Accordingly, in order to remove every possibility of misunderstanding on the part of Russia respecting the attitude of the Japanese Government, you are instructed to deliver to Count Lamsdorff a Note Verbale to the following effect:

"The Imperial Government have examined with great care and attention the new Russian Counter-Proposals of the 11th instant. They regret to find that the Imperial Russian Government did not see their way in those proposals to give to the compass of the suggested understanding the same territorial extension as was deemed essential by Japan. The Imperial Government, in their original invitation to the Imperial Russian Government in August last, endeavoured to make it entirely clear that they desired, with a view to remove from their relations with the Imperial Russian Government every cause for future misunderstanding, to bring within the purview of the proposed arrangement all those regions in the Extreme East where the interests of the two Empires meet, and they cannot

bring themselves to the conviction that a full realization of that desire can be expected if a large and important portion of those regions is wholly excluded from consideration. Accordingly, the Imperial Government feel constrained to ask the Imperial Russian Government to reconsider their position on the subject, and they hope that the Russian Government will be able to see their way to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the question. The Imperial Government also find it necessary to ask for the following amendments to the new Russian Counter Proposals: —

'*a.* Article II to read: "Recognition by Russia of Japan's preponderating interests in Corea and of the right of Japan to give Corea advice and assistance tending to improve the administration of the Corean Empire."

'*b.* Article V to read: "Mutual engagement not to undertake on the Corean coast any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Corea;" and.

"*c.* Artirle VI to be suppressed.

"As the principal part of these amendments cannot be said to be in excess of the modifications which were agreed to *ad referendum* at Tokio and as the Imperial Government consider those changes indispensable, it is hoped that they will receive the ready agreement of the Imperial Russian Government."

In presenting the foregoing note to Count Lamsdorff, you will say that I have spoken to Baron Rosen in a similar sense, and you will also express the desire for an early response.

No 36.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, December 23rd, 1903
Received, " 24th, "

Upon receipt of your telegraphic instructions, I saw Count Lamsdorff December 23rd at 2 p.m.

He told me he had received a telegram from Baron Rosen, stating that the latter had had an interview with you, and that particulars would follow, but such particulars had not been

received yet by him. When I handed him the Note Verbale, he said that he would study it together with report from Baron Rosen, and that he would do his best to send the Russian answer at the earliest possible date; but he added that he would have to communicate with Admiral Alexieff. In conclusion, I stated to him that under the present circumstances it might cause serious difficulties, even complications, if we failed to come to an *entente*, and I hoped he would exercise his best influence so as to enable us to reach the desired end.

No. 37.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, January 1st, 1904.
Received, „ 2nd, „

I saw Count Lamsdorff January 1st, and asked whether any action had been taken regarding our last propositions. He said they had been fully considered; and he asked me to assure you that Baron Rosen will soon be instructed to proceed with the negotiations in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, and he added that he saw no reason why we could not arrive at an *entente*.

No. 38.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, January 7th, 1904.

Baron Rosen handed to me January 6th the following reply of the Russian Government to our last propositions of December 21st last:—

"Having no objection to the amendments to Article II of the Russian Counter-Proposals as proposed by the Imperial Japanese Government, the Imperial Government considers it necessary:

"1. To maintain the original wording of Article V which had already been agreed to by the Imperial Japanese Government, that is to say, 'mutual engagement not to use any part of the territory of Corea for strategical purposes, nor to undertake on the coasts of Corea any military works capable of menacing the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Corea.'

"2. To maintain Article VI concerning a neutral zone (this for the very purpose which the Imperial Japanese Government has likewise in view, that is to say, to eliminate everything that might lead to misunderstandings, in the future; a similar zone, for example exists between the Russian and British possessions in Central Asia). "In case the above conditions are agreed to, the Imperial Government would be prepared to include in the projected agreement an Article of the following tenor:

"Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and her littoral as being outside her sphere of interests, whilst Russia, within the limits of that province, will not impede Japan, nor other Powers in the enjoyment of rights and privileges acquired by them under existing treaties with China, exclusive of the establishment of settlements."

No. 39.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, January 13th, 1904.

You are instructed to deliver to Count Lamsdorff a Note Verbale to the following effect which, you will say, is intended to confirm to him the views of the Imperial Government communicated by me to Baron Rosen on the 13th January:—

The Imperial Government, in order to arrive at a pacific solution of the pending questions and to firmly establish the basis of good relation between Japan and Russia and in addition with a view to protect the rights and interests of Japan, have given most careful and serious consideration to the reply of the Imperial Russian Government which was delivered by His Excellency Baron Rosen on the 6th instant. They have finally come to the conclusion that the following modifications are necessary, i e.:—

1. Suppression of the first clause of Article V of the Russian Counter-Proposals (presented to the Japanese Government through Baron Rosen December 11th) that is to say, "not to use any part of Corean territory for strategical purposes."

2. Suppression of the whole Article (VI) concerning establishment of a neutral zone.

3. The Russian proposal concerning Manchuria to be agreed to with the following modifications;

a. Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being outside her sphere of interest and an engagement on the part of Russia to respect the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria.

b. Russia within the limits of Manchuria will not impede Japan nor other Powers in the enjoyment of rights and privileges acquired by them under the existing treaties with China.

c. Recognition by Russia of Corea and its littoral as being outside her sphere of interest.

4. Addition of an article to the following effect:—

Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Manchuria and of the right of Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of those interests.

The grounds for those amendments having been frequently and fully explained on previous occasions, the Imperial Government do not think it necessary to repeat the explanations. It is sufficient here to express their earnest hope for reconsideration by the Imperial Russian Government.

It should be further remarked that the suppression of the clause excluding the establishment of settlements in Manchuria is desired because it conflicts with stipulations of the new Commercial Treaty between Japan and China. In this respect, however, Japan will be satisfied if she receives equal treatment with another Power which has already acquired similar rights in regard to settlements in Manchuria. The statement in the Russian reply that the Japanese Government have agreed to the original wording of Article V of the Russian Counter-Proposals is erroneous, no such agreement ever having been expressed by the Imperial Government.

The above-mentioned amendments being proposed by the Imperial Government entirely in a spirit of conciliation, it is expected that they will be received with the same spirit at the *hands of* the Imperial Russian Government; and the Imperial

Government further hope for an early reply from the Imperial Russian Government since further delay in the solution of the question will be extremely disadvantageous to the two countries.

No. 40.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, January 23rd, 1904.

You are instructed to sound Count Lamsdorff respecting the probable nature of Russia's reply to our last note and when the reply will be delivered.

No. 41.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, January 25th, 1904.
Received, „ „ „

In reference to your telegram of 23rd instant, I saw Count Lamsdorff January 24th and asked his views in regard to our last proposals and also how soon the Russian answer could be given. He was not inclined to enter into details, but said that there are certain points to which he could not agree. He expects to lay his views before the Emperor next Tuesday, January 26th, and he hopes to be able to send an answer before long.

M. de Hartwig whom I saw this afternoon, told me that the Department of Foreign Affairs is yet in communication with Admiral Alexieff, and he cannot say how soon an answer can be sent to Japan.

No. 42.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, January 26th, 1904.

As the situation admits of no indefinite delay in the settlement of the questions involved, you will seek an interview with Count Lamsdorff at the earliest opportunity and state to him as an instruction from your Government that in the opinion of the Imperial Government a further prolongation of the present state of things being calculated to accentuate the gravity of the situation, it is their earnest hope that they will be honoured

with an early reply, and that they wish to know at what time they may expect to receive the reply.

No. 43.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, January 26th, 1904.
Received, „ 27th, „

In reference to your telegram of the 26th instant, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the Ministers of War, Marine and other authorities concerned are to meet on the 28th January for the consideration of the question, and that their decision will be submitted to the Emperor for sanction, and he remarked that it had been the intention of Admiral Alexieff to come here; but that idea was now abandoned, and his opinion will soon be received by telegraph. Under these circumstances, he say, he is unable to give the exact date when the reply will be given; but he can say it will not be much delayed. He said that he had received reports from official sources to the effect that Japan had sent a considerable number of troops, munitions and war materials to Corea, and asked me whether I could give any explanation regarding it. I simply answered that I knew nothing of such facts, and regretted not being able to give him any explanation. He added that such action on the part of Japan causes a very bad impression, while the two Governments are engaged seriously in such important negotiations. Telegraph me for my information whether the reports are true, and if so, the details.

No. 44.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, January 28th, 1904.

In reference to your telegram of 26th instant, you will see Count Lamsdorff at an early opportunity and say to him that you have been authorized to deny positively the statement that Japan has sent to Corea a considerable number of troops, munitions and war materials. As a matter of fact, no troops have recently been sent to Corea nor any ammunitions have been sent beyond the amount required for the ordinary use of *the Japanese* troops stationed in Corea. You will then ask

him whether the report that Russian troops are being concentrated on the Corean frontier is true, and if so, that such military movement is to be highly deprecated. Finally, you will ask him whether he is not able to acquaint you, for your own information, with the nature of the decision taken at the proposed conference of the Ministers on the 28th January, and whether he can indicate the approximate date on which the Russian reply is to be given.

No. 45.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, January, 28th, 1904.
Received, „ 29th, „

Count Lamsdorff is satisfied with the explanation contained in your telegram of to-day. As to the question regarding the concentration of Russian troops near the Yalu, he does not believe it to be true, and he remarked that such newspaper reports are very regrettable. I tried to obtain information about the decision of to-day's meeting. He said that it is not possible for him to say anything concerning it as it will not be sent to the Emperor, and that until the respective Ministers have been received by the Emperor respecting the question, nothing can be said definitely. He stated that the Grand Duke Alexis and the Minister of Marine are to be received in audience next Monday, and the Minister of War and himself on Tuesday; and he thinks an answer will be sent to Admiral Alexieff on the latter day. I pointed out the urgent necessity to accelerate the despatch of an answer as much as possible, because further prolongation of the present condition is not only undesirable but rather dangerous. I added that all the while the world is loud with rumours and that I hoped he would take special steps so as to have an answer sent at an earlier date than mentioned. He replied that he knows the existing condition of things very well, but that the dates of audience being fixed as above-mentioned, it is not now possible to change them; and he repeated that he will do his best to send the reply next Tuesday.

No. 46.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, January 30th, 1904.

In reference to your telegram of January 28th, you are instructed to see Count Lamsdorff at the earliest opportunity and state to him substantially in the following sense:—

"Having reported to your Government that the Russian Government would probably give a reply on next Tuesday, you have been instructed to say to Count Lamsdorff that being fully convinced of the serious disadvantage to the two Powers concerned of the further prolongation of the present situation, the Imperial Government hoped that they might be able to receive the reply of the Russian Government earlier than the date mentioned by Count Lamsdorff. As it, however, appears that the receipt of the reply at an earlier date is not possible, the Imperial Government wish to know whether they will be honoured with the reply at the date mentioned by Count Lamsdorff, namely, next Tuesday, or if it is not possible, what will be the exact date on which the reply is to be given."

If Count Lamsdorff specifies the day on which the reply is to be given, you will see him on that day and ask him to acquaint you with the exact nature of the reply.

No. 47.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, February 1st, 1904.

Received, „ „ „

Regarding your telegram of the 30th January, I saw Count Lamsdorff in the evening January 31st. He says he appreciates fully the gravity of the present situation, and is certainly desirous to send an answer as quickly as possible; but the question is a very serious one and is not to be lightly dealt with. In addition, the opinions of the Ministers concerned and Admiral Alexieff had to be brought into harmony; hence the natural delay. As to the date of sending an answer, he says, it is not possible for him to give the exact date as it entirely depends upon the decision of the Emperor, though he will not *fail to use his efforts* to hurry the matter.

No. 48.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, February 5th, 1904. 2.15 p.m.

Further prolongation of the present situation being inadmissible, the Imperial Government have decided to terminate the pending negotiations and to take such independent action as they may deem necessary to defend their menaced position and to protect their rights and interests. Accordingly you are instructed to address to Count Lamsdorff, immediately upon receipt of this telegram, a signed note to the following effect:—

"The undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, has the honour, in pursuance of instructions from his Government, to address to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias the following communication:

"The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan regard the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Corea as essential to their own repose and safety, and they are consequently unable to view with indifference any action tending to render the position of Corea insecure.

"The successive rejections by the Imperial Russian Government by means of inadmissible amendments, of Japan's proposals respecting Corea, the adoption of which the Imperial Government regarded as indispensable to assure the independence and territorial integrity of the Corean Empire and to safeguard Japan's preponderating interests in the Peninsula, coupled with the successive refusals of the Imperial Russian Government to enter into engagements to respect China's territorial integrity in Manchuria which is seriously menaced by their continued occupation of the province, notwithstanding their treaty engagements with China and their repeated assurance to other Powers possessing interests in those regions, have made it necessary for the Imperial Government seriously to consider what measures of self-defence they are called upon to take.

"In the presence of delays which remain largely un-

explained and naval and military activities which it is difficult to reconcile with entirely pacific aims, the Imperial Government have exercised in the depending negotiations, a degree of forbearance which they believe affords abundant proof of their loyal desire to remove from their relations with the Imperial Russian Government every cause for future misunderstanding. But finding in their efforts no prospect of securing from the Imperial Russian Government an adhesion either to Japan's moderate and unselfish proposals or to any other proposals likely to establish a firm and enduring peace in the Extreme East, the Imperial Government have no other alternative than to terminate the present futile negotiations.

"In adopting that course the Imperial Government reserve to themselves the right to take such independent action as they may deem best to consolidate and defend their menaced position, as to protect their established rights and legitimate interests.

"The Undersigned, etc., etc."

No. 49.

BARON KOMURA TO MR. KURINO.

(Telegram.) Tokio, February 5th, 1904, 2.15 p.m.

You are instructed to address to Count Lamsdorff a signed note to the following effect simultaneously with the note mentioned in my previous telegram:—

"The Undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentialy of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, has the honour, in pursuance of instructions from his Government, to acquaint His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias that the Imperial Government of Japan, having exhausted without effect every means of conciliation with a view to the removal from their relations with the Imperial Russian Government of every cause for future complications and finding that their just representations and moderate unselfish proposals in the interest of a firm and lasting peace in the Extreme East are not receiving the consideration which is their due, have resolved *to sever their* diplomatic relations with the Imperial Russian

Government which for the reason named have ceased to possess any value.

"In further fulfilment of the command of his Government, the Undersigned has also the honour to announce to His Excellency Count Lamsdorff that it is his intention to take his departure from St. Petersburg with the staff of the Imperial Legation on.....date.

"The Undersigned, etc., etc.

No. 50.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, February 5th, 1904, 5.05 a.m.
Received, „ „ „ 5.15 p.m.

In compliance with the request of Count Lamsdorff, I went to see him at 8 p.m. February 4th. He told me that the substance of the Russian answer had been just sent to Admiral Alexieff to be transmitted to Baron Rosen. He added that Admiral Alexieft may happen to introduce some changes so as to meet local circumstances; but in all probability there will be no such changes. He then stated as his own opinion that Russia desires the principle of independence and integrity of Corea and also of necessity, the free passage of the Corea Straits. Though Russia is willing to make every possible concession, she does not desire to see Corea utilized for strategic purposes against Russia and believes it useful for the consolidation of good relations with Japan to establish by common accord a buffer region between confines of direct influence and action of the two countries in the Far East. The above is expressed entirely as his personal opinion, and I cannot say whether the same is the substance of the above-mentioned answer, though it seems to be very probable.

No. 51.

MR. KURINO TO BARON KOMURA.

(Telegram.) Petersburg, February 6th, 1904, 5.57 p.m.
Received, „ 7th, „ 5.54 a.m.

In reference to your two telegrams of yesterday's date, I presented to Count Lamsdorff to-day at 4 p.m. the notes as instructed. I shall withdraw from here with my staff and students on the 10th instant.

II

An Official statement refuting the charges of treachery and provocation preferred against this country by Russia.

The Russian Government have, in their communqués of the 18th and 20th instant, charged Japan with having treacherously obtained a slight victory by a sudden attack upon Russia, who was bent upon maintaining peace, and asserted that since the rupture of diplomatic relations can never be looked upon as the opening of hostilities, and since Japan did not issue her declaration of war until on the 11th, she was guilty of a flagrant breach of the principles of International Law in making as early as the 8th Feb. most unwarrantable attacks on Russian men-of-war and merchant ships.

That Russia had never entertained any sincere desire for peace may be clearly seen from the facts that she persistently refused throughout the whole course of the negotiations to meet the proposals made by Japan in a conciliatory spirit, and that by wanton delays put off the settlement of the question, while at the same time she was busily extending her naval and military preparations. In confirmation of these facts may be given her warlike preparations in the Far East since April last, when she failed to carry out her promised second evacuation of Manchuria.

INCREASE IN NAVAL STRENGTH.

	No.	Tonnage.
Battleships	3	38,488
Armoured cruiser...	1	7,726
Cruisers...	5	26,417
Torpedo destroyers	7	2,450

	No.	Tonnage.
Gunboat	1	1,334
Mine-ships	2	6,000
Total...	19	82,415

In addition to these, Russia sent destroyers in section by rail to Port Arthur. The work of putting those vessels together was hurried up and seven of them have been already completed. Furthermore, two vessels of the Volunteer Fleet were armed at Vladivostock and hoisted the Russian naval ensign.

She further ordered out one battleship, three cruisers, seven destroyers and four torpedo-boats (total tonnage amounting to about 30,740), which might have joined the Russian squadron already in the Far East, had not certain ulterior circumstances compelled Russia to recall them, and these if added to the others, would make the aggregate increase of 113,000 tons.

INCREASE IN LAND FORCES.

Since the 29th June last, when on the pretext of a trial transportation on the Siberian railway Russia sent to Chita two infantry brigades, two artillery battalions, a body of cavalry and a military train, Russia has continued to dispatch troops to the Far East, and at the beginning of the present month (February 1904) their total augmented strength was over 40,000, and plans were being made for sending out, if necessary, over 200,000 more.

She has at the same time been engaged day and night in strengthening the fortifications at the naval ports of Port Arthur and Vladivostock, building forts at Hunchun, Liaoyang and other strategical points, and forwarding arms and ammunition to the Far East by the Siberian railway and the Volunteer fleet; and in the middle of October last, a train of 14 cars hurriedly left Russia laden with the equipment of a field hospital.

It is therefore quite evident that Russia had not the least inclination for friendly settlement, but solely by military preponderance to force Japan into submission.

The military activity of Russia became from the latter part

of January to the beginning of February still further intensified. On the 21st January about two battalions of infantry and a detachment of cavalry were dispatched from Port Arthur and Dalny to the northern frontier of Korea; and on the 28th of the same month, an order to prepare for war was given by Admiral Alexieff to the forces which were stationed in the vicinity of the Yalu; and on the 1st of February, the Commander at Vladivostock, under orders from his Government, requested the Japanese Commercial Agent at that port that, as a state of siege might at any moment be proclaimed there, he would make his nationals prepare to withdraw to Khabarovsk. At Port Arthur all the powerful warships, except a bottleship then under repair, steamed into the open sea, while troops advanced in large forces from Liaoyang towards the Yalu.

Who can then say that Russia had no warlike intentions or that she was unprepared for war? Japan, seeing that the situation had become so critical that it admitted of no further delay, was compelled to break off the abortive negotiations and decided to take necessary steps for self-protection. The responsibility for the challenge to war rests then not with Japan, but solely with Russia.

Finally, on the 6th February Japan announced to Russia her decision to terminate pending negotiations and that she would take such independent action as she might deem best to defend her position menaced by Russia and to protect her established rights and legitimate interests, and that she would sever her diplomatic relations and withdraw her Legation. The term independent action naturally includes the opening of hostilities. Even supposing that Russia was unable to understand it in that sense, that is of course no reason why Japan should, in Russia's place, be held reponsible for the misinterpretation. Again, it is the unanimous opinion of international jurists that a declaration of war is not an indispensable pre-requisite to the opening of hostilities. Indeed, it has been the common practice in recent wars to declare war subsequently to the opening of hostilities. Japan's action is not therefore open to the least criticism from the standpoint of international law. *It must certainly* be confessed that the charge sounds rather

odd, coming as it does from the lips of Russia; for there are not only very many historical instances of that country herself instantly taking a hostile action without declaring war, but in 1808 she invaded Finland even before the rupture of their diplomatic relations.

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

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

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